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abstract: Does the method of reflective equilibrium (henceforth, RE) involve ethi-
cal intuitions? If not, what are the so-called “considered judgments” invoked at the 
beginning of the process of reflective equilibrium? Contrary to the principal tendency 
in moral and political philosophy, I provide a negative answer to the first question . 
I hold that ethical intuitions are non-inferential beliefs . I then claim that RE does 
not involve ethical intuitions because its coherentist character rejects, by definition, 
any type of non-inferentiality . Concerning the second question above, I provide an 
answer that preserves the epistemological consistency of RE: considered judgments 
should be defined as inferential beliefs . The possibility of their inferential character 
relies on the role of background beliefs in the process of reflective equilibrium . In 
brief, I criticise and reformulate the standard interpretation of RE by claiming that it 
does not involve ethical intuitions but only inferential beliefs .
key words: Reflective equilibrium, Intuitions, Considered Judgments, Justification, 
Foundationalism, Coherentism .
“[…] justification is a matter of the mutual 
support of many considerations, of everything 
fitting together into one coherent view .”
Rawls (1999: 19)
I. Introduction
Suppose Jack addresses an ethical question by following the method of reflec-
tive equilibrium in its standard version (henceforth, RE) .1 Jack begins the 
process of reflective equilibrium from some of his considered judgments at all 
1 The locus classicus of that standard version is Rawls (1999: 40–46) . For some classic 
explorations of this standard version, see: Daniels (1979), DePaul (1993) .
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levels of generality such as “slavery is wrong”, “torturing babies is wrong” and 
so on . After an extensive process of mutual adjustment, Jack holds a justi-
fied set of beliefs integrated by considered judgments, explanatory principles 
and background theories . In this paper, I focus my attention on two main 
questions: Does RE involve ethical intuitions? If not, what are the so-called 
“considered judgments” invoked at the beginning of the process of reflective 
equilibrium? Contrary to the principal tendency in contemporary moral and 
political philosophy, I provide a negative answer to the first question . Follow-
ing the main trend in contemporary moral epistemology, I hold that ethical 
intuitions should be understood as non-inferential beliefs (Audi 1997; Bedke 
2010; Brun 2014; Huemer 2005; Kirchin 2005; McMahan 2000) . I then 
claim that RE does not involve ethical intuitions because its coherentist char-
acter rejects, by definition, any type of non-inferentiality . Concerning the 
second question above, I argue that considered judgments are (necessarily) 
inferential beliefs held by the individual on the basis of background beliefs 
– i .e . second-order beliefs about the reliability of considered judgments .
I proceed as follows . Firstly, I set out relevant features of RE and spec-
ify the concept of an ethical intuition (Section II) . After analysing Daniels’ 
classic responses to the questions mentioned before (Daniels 1979; 2013), 
I develop the argument summarised above (Sections III and IV) . Finally, I 
address some possible objections (Section V) . I conclude by emphasising the 
relevance of coherentism in the interpretation of RE .
II. Some Relevant Aspects of RE & Intuitions
For Goodman, the justification of rules of inference is “the delicate one of 
making mutual adjustments between [these] rules and accepted inferences” 
(Goodman 1983: 64) . RE is based on this notion of “mutual adjustment” . It 
should be understood via two ideas . The first idea refers to the concept of re-
flective equilibrium: the justification of considered judgments, principles and 
background theories depends on their mutual support (Daniels 1979; 1980; 
2013; Rawls 1999) .2 The second idea refers to the process, wherein RE starts 
from considered judgments conceived under favourable conditions . It should 
be noted that these judgments are beliefs at all levels of generality – e .g . judg-
ments about particular cases, normative principles, moral conceptions, etc . 
(Rawls 1974: 8; 2001: 30) . After this, explanatory principles are proposed, 
and background theories are integrated into the process of reflective equilib-
2 In Daniels’ words: “The method of wide reflective equilibrium is an attempt to produce 
coherence in an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely, (a) a set of 
considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background 
theories” (Daniels 1979: 258) . 
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rium . Finally, all these components are mutually adjusted by the individual 
(Daniels 1979: 258–259; DePaul 1993: 16–23; Rawls 1999: 40–46) .
The first question of this paper is whether RE involves ethical intuitions . 
But there is an important preliminary query that should be addressed by any 
serious answer to that question: what is an ethical intuition? For the purposes 
of this paper, it is not necessary to provide an exhaustive definition (i .e . an 
exhaustive set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) . Rather, it is 
necessary to specify some necessary features . Let me introduce an incomplete 
definition with an example: Suppose there are two philosophers (Jack and 
Susan) discussing . Jack says: “I believe W” . Susan asks: “why do you believe 
W?” Jack responds: “I believe W because Y” . Susan asks: “why do you believe 
Y?” Jack responds: “I believe Y because Z” . Susan asks: “why do you believe 
Z?” Jack responds: “because Z is self-evident” .
For foundationalism, there are two types of justified beliefs in this hypo-
thetical case . First, some justified beliefs are held on the basis of other beliefs 
(in this case: W, Y) . For example, if someone claims “I believe that war is mor-
ally impermissible because killing is wrong”, it is said that the first belief (i .e . 
“war is morally impermissible”) is justified on the basis of another belief – i .e . 
“killing is wrong” . Call them “inferential beliefs” . Second, foundationalism 
holds that some justified beliefs are not held on the basis of other beliefs (in 
this case: Z) . For the foundationalist model of reasoning, this type of belief 
overcomes the well-known “regress problem” . For example, if someone says 
“I believe that killing is wrong because it is self-evident”, this alleged justified 
belief is not justified on the basis of another belief . Call them “non-inferential 
beliefs” . This straightforward categorisation of two different types of justified 
beliefs can be summarised as follows:
(P1) P is an inferential (justified) belief iff it is held by the individual on 
the basis of other beliefs . E .g . Jack states: “I believe W because Y”
(P2) Q is a non-inferential (justified) belief iff it is not held by the in-
dividual on the basis of other beliefs . E .g . Jack states: “I believe Z 
because it is self-evident”
It is widely accepted that “intuitions” fall under the second category: 
ethical intuitions are defined as non-inferential (sometimes called: “self-evi-
dent”, “basic”) beliefs .3 Let me provide some examples . Audi holds that “an 
3 There is discussion on whether intuitions are just “beliefs” . For example, Brun (2014) 
defines intuitions as non-inferential beliefs, but Huemer (2005) holds that intuitions are not 
beliefs but “intellectual seemings” . This conceptual discussion goes beyond the limits of this 
work because this paper is only focussed on the inferential character of intuitions . For this 
reason, I follow Audi’s generalisation: “In the contexts that concern us, intuitions will typically 
be beliefs” (Audi 1997: 40) . 
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intuition must be non-inferential, in the sense that the intuited proposition” 
is not held on the basis of other beliefs (Audi 1997: 47) . For Alexander & 
Weinberg, ethical intuitions are the “non-inferential, defeasible justificatory 
foundation” of our theories (Alexander & Weinberg 2014: 189) . Bedke holds 
that an intuition is “non-inferential” because its justification does not depend 
on other beliefs (Bedke 2010: 1069) . Brun argues that “non-inferentiality is 
the best candidate for a common denominator of the various accounts of 
intuitions” (Brun 2014: 244) . Huemer holds that ethical intuitions are non-
inferential in the sense that intuitions are the starting points of normative 
reasoning (Huemer 2005: 101–105) .4 It should be noted that this agree-
ment between moral epistemologists is not arbitrary at all . There are two 
reasons suggested in the literature . First, some authors suggest that such an 
incomplete definition (to be more precise, the necessary inferential charac-
ter of intuitions) seems to capture our intuitions about the concept of “in-
tuition” . Consider the straightforward categorisation specified above . For 
some authors, it seems intuitively correct to say that intuitions fall under 
the second category (Alexander & Weinberg 2014) . But the standard reason 
is that such an incomplete definition seems to capture an important aspect 
of the ordinary usage of the term . For example, it is an undeniable fact that 
contemporary philosophers tend to use the term “intuition” when they try 
to conceptualise the phenomenon of (supposed) immediate justified beliefs 
about several thought experiments – e .g . ethical intuitions about trolley cases, 
prima facie duties, moral principles, the transitivity of value, the definitional 
structure of moral concepts, etc . (Bedke 2010) .
To sum up, RE is based on Goodman’s notion of “mutual adjustment” . 
RE integrates three crucial elements: considered judgments at all levels of 
generality, explanatory principles and background theories . The fundamen-
tal question is whether RE involves ethical intuitions (i .e . non-inferential 
beliefs) . In what follows, I shall analyse the classic response provided in the 
literature – i .e . Daniels’ influential response (Daniels 1979; 2013) . After that, 
I shall present an argument, based on the content of this section, which is 
superior to his account .
III. The Basic Problem of the Classic Response
Daniels (1979; 2013) provides the most prominent answer to the question 
of whether RE involves ethical intuitions by defending an alleged distinc-
tion between considered judgments and ethical intuitions . Let me analyse 
this classic argument in some detail . For Daniels, intuitions carry “epistemic 
4 See also: (Kirchin 2005; McMahan 2000) .
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privilege” . This type of “privilege” implies “self-evidence” and low levels of 
“revisability” (Daniels 1979: 264) . Daniels quickly suggests that considered 
judgments should not be understood as self-evident beliefs, but he does not 
develop this further (Daniels 1979; 2013) . For him, the general distinction 
between considered judgments and ethical intuitions mainly refers to the 
different level of revisability of these beliefs . In Daniels’ (1979: 266–267; see 
also Daniels 2013) own words:
Wide [reflective] equilibrium does not merely systematize some determinate set 
of judgments . Rather, it permits extensive revision of these moral judgments . 
There is no set of judgments that is held more or less fixed as there would be on 
a foundationalist approach, even one without foundations . It will be useful to 
see just how far from the more traditional view of a moral intuition the consid-
ered moral judgment in wide reflective equilibrium has come . (…) [W]ide re-
flective equilibrium, as I have described it, allows far more drastic theory-based 
revisions of moral judgments . (…) No one type of considered moral judgment 
is held immune to revision .
The distinction defended by the author is straightforward: considered judg-
ments are more revisable than ethical intuitions because RE “allows far more 
drastic theory-based revisions of moral judgments” (Daniels 1979: 266) . Put 
in other words, the distinctive feature of considered judgments would be 
their high level of revisability because RE requires us “to revise our beliefs at 
all levels as we work back and forth among them and subject them to various 
criticisms” (Daniels 2013) . This distinctive feature of considered judgments 
is emphasised by Rawls himself when he says that considered judgments 
“must eventually be revised, suspended, or withdrawn” (Rawls 2001: 30) . 
For this reason, Daniels argues, it would be wrong to claim that RE involves 
ethical intuitions (convictions with a low level of revisability) in the form of 
considered judgments (convictions with a high level of revisability) .
From an epistemological perspective, it is evident that Daniels’ response 
is inherently problematic . As he rightly suggests, the level of revisability of 
our beliefs is not an intrinsic but an accidental feature because it is modeled 
by an epistemological background . For example, as he rightly suggests in the 
quote above, RE is what “allows far more drastic theory-based revisions of 
moral judgments” (Daniels 1979: 266) . Given this premise, Daniels’ distinc-
tion is problematic because there are two types of foundationalism that imply 
different levels of revisability of our beliefs . For the strong version of foun-
dationalism, ethical intuitions are infallible – that is the so-called “Cartesian 
foundationalism” . In this case, Daniels’ distinction applies without any prob-
lem . For the modest version of foundationalism, however, ethical intuitions 
do not carry such an epistemic privilege because our beliefs can be refuted 
by further evidence . In this case, Daniels’ distinction is blurred . Let me give 
an example that clarifies this point . According to Huemer, the principle of 
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“phenomenal conservatism” plays an important role in epistemology . This 
basic principle states that intellectual inquiry “proceeds by assuming things 
are the way they appear, until evidence (…) arises to cast doubt on this” 
(Huemer 2005: 101) . Huemer provides an example . Suppose I see a glass 
of water on the table . under the principle of phenomenal conservatism, my 
visual perception is enough to justify the belief that there is a glass of water 
on the table . Nevertheless, he adds, “I may still hold this open to revision: if 
I reach for the glass and find my hand passing through it (…) I may decide 
there wasn’t a glass there after all” (Huemer 2005: 107) . under this founda-
tionalist framework, the author holds that “as long as our foundationalism 
is of a moderate form, it is not impossible to reason about intuitive moral 
principles . We may hold even intuitive moral principles open to revision” 
(Huemer 2005: 143) .
In brief, Daniels provides a negative answer to the question of whether RE 
involves ethical intuitions by defending an alleged distinction between them 
and considered judgments . However, Daniels’ classic distinction is inherently 
problematic because modest foundationalism blurs it: for the modest version 
of foundationalism, ethical intuitions can be understood as non-inferential 
but revisable beliefs . In what follows, I shall present an argument that avoids 
the basic problem of Daniels’ classic response . The argument is partially based 
on the categorisation presented in the second section (P1, P2) .
IV. The Coherentist Response: Justification without Intuitions
In this section, I provide an argument that is neutral regarding the well-
known discussion between coherentism and foundationalism . My starting 
point is the very definition of RE . The standard version of this method is 
widely interpreted as an expression of coherentist-based justification (Little 
1984; Daniels 1979; 2013; DePaul 1993; Nielsen 1989; Timmons 1990) . 
The coherentist interpretation is primarily supported by Rawls’ systematic 
idea that “justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considera-
tions, of everything fitting together into one coherent view” (Rawls 1999: 19; 
see also: Rawls 1999: 320, 507; 1980: 534; 2001: 31) .5 Some points deserve 
attention . First, it is well-known that the central idea of coherentism is that 
the justification of any belief depends on its coherence with other beliefs 
held by the individual (Audi 2011; BonJour 1985) . Call this the “coherentist 
5 Additionally, it is supported by Rawls’ rejection of non-inferential beliefs (P2) . In his 
own words: “A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or condi-
tions on principles” (Rawls 1999: 19); “I have not proceeded then as if first principles, or con-
ditions thereon, or definitions either, have special features that permit them a peculiar place in 
justifying a moral doctrine” (Rawls 1999: 507) .
45C . RETTIG: Reflective Equilibrium: Justification without Intuitions
thesis” . What does “coherence” mean? It is widely accepted that the lack of 
logical contradiction is not sufficient because we need mutually supportive 
connections too . For this reason, coherent sets of beliefs imply the property 
of “connectedness” which can be understood as a “dynamic property” because 
it depends on the level of connection of several beliefs . As an author nicely 
summarises, “the idea is then that the members of a coherent system of beliefs 
stand in fairly pervasive inferential relations of this sort to each other, with 
the degree of coherence depending on the degree to which this is so, that is, 
on the number and strength of these inferential connections” (BonJour 2010: 
188) . For example, an investigative report done by the FBI reflects that epis-
temic property: the large amount of evidence gathered, testimonies of wit-
nesses, etc . form a coherent set of justified beliefs whose internal support can 
increase if the FBI adds more evidence . Second, given that the justification of 
our beliefs relies on supportive relations, there is no belief that is independ-
ent, in terms of its justification, from the connection with other beliefs . Call 
this the “coherentist restriction” – the negative side of the “coherentist thesis” . 
What this means is that coherentism rejects precisely what any type of foun-
dationalism supports – i .e . the possibility of non-inferential justification . For 
the sake of my argument, I shall return to this later .
Due to the coherentist thesis and restriction, it is not difficult to see, in 
principle, that considered judgments should not be defined as ethical intui-
tions (i .e . non-inferential beliefs) but (P1) inferential beliefs even at the first 
stage of the process of reflective equilibrium . Call this the “coherentist claim” .6 
The reason behind the negative side of the coherentist claim (i .e . consid-
ered judgments should not be defined as non-inferential beliefs) is straight-
forward: if considered judgments are ethical intuitions (i .e . non-inferential 
beliefs), the coherentist restriction is violated and, therefore, the epistemo-
logical background of RE would be inconsistent . Put in other words, to say 
that RE involves ethical intuitions in the form of “considered judgments” 
goes simply against the completely inferential character of its epistemologi-
cal background . Let me explain this further by returning to the hypothetical 
example presented at the outset of this work . Suppose Jack begins the process 
6 The objector could say: “such an assertion assumes that it is possible to make a distinc-
tion between intuitions (i .e . non-inferential beliefs) and considered judgments (i .e . inferential 
beliefs) . But the problem is that if coherentism is true, that distinction is undermined by the 
coherentist thesis because there are no non-inferential beliefs” . It should be noted that this ob-
jection is avoided here because my argument is neutral on the discussion between coherentism 
and foundationalism . To clarify the point, consider this analogy . Suppose Giulio is writing an 
introduction to political philosophy . In his introductory book, he analyses influential theories 
such as Bentham’s utilitarianism, Rawls’ theory of justice, etc . Even if Giulio is neutral regard-
ing substantive discussions between these theories, it is evident that he may legitimately claim 
that the inclusion of the principle of utility in the Rawlsian framework is inherently problem-
atic because it generates an inconsistency in the theory . I am doing something similar here .
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of reflective equilibrium from some of his considered judgments . After an 
extensive process of mutual adjustment, Jack holds a set of justified beliefs 
formed by considered judgments, explanatory principles and background 
theories . For some reason, Jack holds that considered judgments are non-in-
ferential beliefs . This would be inherently problematic . If Jack says that, what 
he is really saying is that the process of reflective equilibrium can increase an 
independent level of justification (of some non-inferential beliefs) by coher-
ence . However, this is problematic because the presence of any level of non-
inferential justification in the process of reflective equilibrium violates the 
coherentist restriction specified above . In brief, as soon as the epistemological 
perspective is adopted, it is inherently problematic to hold that RE involves 
ethical intuitions (defined as non-inferential beliefs) because of the require-
ments imposed by its epistemological background:7
(P3) RE is an expression of the coherentist model of reasoning . Given 
such an epistemological background, this method cannot involve 
ethical intuitions (i .e . non-inferential beliefs) because that would 
imply the violation of the “coherentist restriction” .
So far so good . Nevertheless, (P3) raises this complex question: if consid-
ered judgments are not ethical intuitions (i .e . non-inferential beliefs), what 
are they? Given the coherentist thesis and restriction, it is not difficult to 
see, in principle, that considered judgments should be defined as inferential 
beliefs (P1) . However, this seems to be inherently problematic because con-
sidered judgments are the primary data (the starting point) of the process 
of reflective equilibrium . Therefore, there are no previous beliefs apparently . 
This complexity can be formulated in another way . The satisfaction of the 
coherentist thesis seems to create an impasse in this paper . On the one hand, 
I argued that considered judgments should not be defined as non-inferential 
beliefs because this would imply the violation of the coherentist restriction 
specified above . On the other hand, considered judgments cannot be defined 
as inferential beliefs because they are the starting point of the process of re-
flective equilibrium .
Fortunately, that impasse is artificial . The reason is mostly unexplored in 
the literature on RE . The point is that considered judgments can be defined 
as inferential beliefs even at the first stage of the process of reflective equilib-
rium because of the unexplored role of background beliefs in that process . 
7 This argument should be differentiated from Brun’s (2014) account . For Brun, intui-
tions are non-inferential beliefs (Brun, 2014, p . 244) . I agree . He holds that the “method of 
reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions” . Nevertheless, he adds: “intui-
tions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium” (Brun, 2014, p . 237) . From 
my perspective, this is inherently problematic because of the reason provided in this section .
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This assertion is mainly based on BonJour’s classic objection to basic beliefs 
(BonJour 1985) .8 In few words, BonJour’s claim is that beliefs are necessarily 
inferential because they are held by the individual on the basis of background 
beliefs about their reliability . I read Rawls’ conceptualisation of considered 
judgments (Rawls 1951; 1999; 2001) under such an argument: considered 
judgments can be defined as inferential beliefs because they are held by the 
individual on the basis of background beliefs – i .e . second-order beliefs about 
the reliability of considered judgments . Let me explain this further . BonJour’s 
(1985: 30–31) classic objection is presented as follows:
[T]he fundamental role which the requirement of epistemic justification serves 
in the overall rationale of the concept of knowledge is that of a means to truth; 
(…) Thus if basic beliefs are to provide a secure foundation for empirical knowl-
edge, (…) then that feature, whatever it may be, by virtue of which a particular 
belief qualifies as basic must also constitute a good reason for thinking that 
the belief is true . (…) If we let F represent the feature or characteristic, what-
ever it may be, which distinguishes basic empirical beliefs from other empiri-
cal beliefs, then in an acceptable foundationalist account a particular empirical 
belief B could qualify as basic only if the premises of the following justificatory 
argument were adequately justified: (1) B has feature F . (2) Beliefs having fea-
ture F are highly likely to be true . Therefore, B is highly likely to be true . (…) 
But if all this is correct, we get the disturbing result that B is not basic after all, 
since its justification depends on that of at least one other empirical belief .
BonJour’s influential argument can be reconstructed in four steps .9 (1) 
Suppose I believe “p” . There are two possibilities: (a) I have a truth indicative 
feature argument for it; (b) I do not have a truth indicative feature argument 
for it . (2) If (a) is the case, “p” is not a basic belief because it is supported by 
such an argument . (3) If (b) is the case, “p” is not a justified basic belief be-
cause it is not justified . (4) Therefore, independently from the case, the con-
clusion is that “p” cannot be defined as a justified basic belief . The argument 
is complex but refers to something common in daily life . For example, any 
belief based on visual perception is held on the basis of background beliefs 
about the accuracy of visual perception (e .g . the belief that my visual percep-
tion is reliable because I do not suffer the problem of Mr . Magoo) . If my 
little sister believes that she is sick on the basis that the doctor said that, her 
justification implies the background belief that the doctor’s opinion is reliable 
because he is an expert . In brief, the argument claims that any belief is held 
by the individual on the basis of background beliefs about the reliability of 
8 I do not invoke BonJour’s objection in order to reject the very possibility of basic 
beliefs . I simply use it to show that considered judgments can be defined as inferential beliefs 
even at the first stage of RE .
9 The following reconstruction is based on Feldman’s interpretation (Feldman 2003: 76) .
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the belief ’s source; therefore, there are no basic (i .e . non-inferential) beliefs in 
the strict sense of the term:
(P4) For BonJour, justification is truth-conducive . The individual holds 
the belief P on the basis of background beliefs about the reliability 
of the belief ’s source (which affect the reliability of P) . Therefore, 
P is not basic .
Rawls’ conceptualisation of considered judgments invokes the relevance 
of background beliefs but not in an equivalent sense . For BonJour, justifica-
tion is truth-conducive . To avoid meta-ethical controversies, Rawls disassoci-
ates the theory of justification from the question about truth and holds that 
its aim is to ground reasonable principles: “in ethics we are attempting to find 
reasonable principles” (Rawls 1951: 178) .10 In order to reach this aim, Rawls 
systematically imposes two types of conditions on the emergence of consid-
ered judgments which would make them reliable judgments .11 First, moral 
conditions: “it is required first that the judgment on a case be given under 
such conditions that the judge is immune from all of the reasonably foresee-
able consequences of the judgment” (Rawls 1951: 181); “it is required that 
the case, on which the judgment is given, be one in which there is an actual 
conflict of interests” (Rawls 1951: 182); “considered judgments are simply 
those rendered under conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of jus-
tice” (Rawls 1999: 42); “those judgments (…) given when we are upset or 
frightened, or when we stand to gain one way or the other can be left aside” 
because “all these judgments are likely to be erroneous or to be influenced by 
an excessive attention to our own interests” (Rawls 1999: 42); among oth-
ers . Second, in terms of general conditions about cognitive reliability, “the 
relevant judgments [considered judgments] are those given under conditions 
favorable for deliberation and judgment in general” (Rawls 1999: 42); “these 
are judgments given under conditions in which our capacity for judgment is 
most likely to have been fully exercised and not affected by distorting influ-
ences” (Rawls 2001: 29), among others .
10 In moral epistemology, it is disputed whether the correspondence theory of truth is 
correct, whether moral beliefs can be true, whether moral beliefs are truth-apt and so on . For 
a concise discussion about truth in ethics, see Lynch (2013) . The locus classicus of the error 
theory is Mackie (1997) . The locus classicus of emotivism is Ayer (1971) . For a recent discus-
sion on these matters, see Miller (2003) .
11 The relevance of this type of “reliability” is nicely captured by DeGrazia (1996) in 
his interpretation of Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium: “(…) we begin with a set of 
judgments that we have good reason to consider reliable, dropping judgments formed in cir-
cumstances known to make judgments unreliable . Thus, we discount wavering judgments, 
ones formed in a rage or in a knee-jerk way, ones likely to be biased by self-interest, and so on” 
(DeGrazia 1996: 19–20; emphasis original) . 
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Two points deserve attention . First, the conditions listed above can be 
translated into several moral and non-moral background beliefs . For exam-
ple, the requirement that considered judgments must emerge under condi-
tions which prevent them from being “influenced by an excessive attention 
to our own interests” implies background beliefs against egoism (Rawls 1999: 
42) . The requirement that considered judgments must emerge under con-
ditions which favour our capacity for judgment implies background beliefs 
about cognitive reliability . Put briefly, the conditions imposed by Rawls on 
the emergence of considered judgments can be translated into several back-
ground beliefs that justify them . Second, as soon as Rawls’ conceptualisation 
of considered judgments is interpreted under BonJour’s argument, consid-
ered judgments can be defined as inferential beliefs even at the first stage 
of the process of reflective equilibrium . The reason is that their justification 
relies on background beliefs concerning their reliability: S holds the consid-
ered judgment P because it emerges under favourable conditions (justified 
by several moral/non-moral background beliefs) which make P reliable – i .e . 
conducive to reasonable principles . Put in other words, S holds P on the basis 
of other beliefs about P’s reliability; therefore, both the coherentist thesis 
and restriction are successfully satisfied even at the first stage of the process 
of reflective equilibrium . It should be emphasised that the crucial point here 
is not that background moral and non-moral beliefs affect the content of 
considered judgments . Rather, the point is that considered judgments cannot 
be held in non-inferential terms and, therefore, the presence of background 
beliefs becomes meaningful and necessary .12
Let me clarify this further with some “why?” questions . Suppose Jack 
holds the considered judgment P at the first stage of the process of reflective 
equilibrium . As Rawls’ framework requires, P was conceived under condi-
tions C that make it reliable (e .g . conditions that prevent considered judg-
ments from being “influenced by an excessive attention to our own interests” 
(Rawls 1999: 42)) . I ask him “why do you believe P?” Put in other words: 
“why do you integrate P in the process of reflective equilibrium?” Jack should 
not provide the following justification: “because P is self-justified – i .e . an 
ethical intuition” . As it was argued before, the reason is that this response 
would violate the coherentist restriction and, therefore, the epistemological 
background of RE would be inconsistent (P3) . Fortunately, Jack provides the 
following response that satisfies both the coherentist thesis and restriction: 
12 Of course, the point defended here is not that the content of considered judgments 
logically follows from moral and non-moral background beliefs – that would be absurd . Rather, 
under the coherentist thesis and restriction, the point defended here is that beliefs (in this 
specific case, considered judgments) necessarily rely, to some relevant extent, on background 
beliefs about the reliability of first-order beliefs . From my interpretation, this is the general 
idea of BonJour’s objection to the possibility of non-inferential beliefs analysed before .
50 Prolegomena 16 (1) 2017
“because it was conceived under conditions C which imply beliefs B (e .g . 
“egoism is wrong”, among other beliefs) that make P reliable – i .e . conducive 
to reasonable principles”13:
(P5) Considered judgments should be defined as inferential beliefs . The 
possibility of their inferential character – which preserves the con-
sistency of the epistemological background of RE– relies on the 
role of background beliefs in the process of reflective equilibrium .
To sum up, does RE involve ethical intuitions? If not, what are the so-
called “considered judgments”? Concerning the first question, I argued that 
RE does not involve ethical intuitions (defined as non-inferential beliefs) 
because its coherentist character rejects, by definition, any type of non-in-
ferentiality . Put in other words: to say that RE involves intuitions is inher-
ently problematic because that would imply the violation of the coherentist 
restriction . Concerning the second question, I argued that considered judg-
ments should be defined as inferential beliefs because of the epistemological 
background of RE . The possibility of their inferential character relies on the 
role of background beliefs in the process of reflective equilibrium (P4, P5) . 
In what follows, I shall address some fundamental objections to my argu-
ment .
V. Two Objections
For the purposes of this paper, I need to address possible objections against 
my argument (not against coherentism in general) .14 The first (I would say, 
“standard”) objection is based on the standard critique against BonJour’s ac-
count of second-order beliefs . For Feldman (2003), BonJour’s argument is 
inherently problematic because “beliefs about the reliability of your percep-
tual system simply are not necessary for justification” . “Of course”, Feldman 
adds, “most of us do have beliefs about this type of reliability, but these beliefs 
are not needed for justification” (Feldman 2003: 77) . It should be empha-
sised that such an objection does not deny the possible justificatory role of 
13 A common mistake is to claim that this coherentist framework cannot avoid the so-
called “regress problem” because second-order beliefs should be justified on the basis of other 
beliefs and so on . That claim is unjustified because it simply omits the coherentist-thesis . For 
coherentism, background beliefs are justified by relations of mutual support . For an explora-
tion of this point: (Bonjour, 2010, pp . 191–192) . 
14 I have avoided some possible objections in the previous section . For example, some-
one could claim that the central claim of this paper (i .e . considered judgments should not 
be defined as ethical intuitions but inferential beliefs) is inherently problematic because the 
coherentist framework rejects the possibility of non-inferential beliefs . I avoided that objection 
because my argument is simply about the formal consistency of RE . 
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background beliefs but the necessary character of this type of justification; in 
his own words, it is just an “extra-justification” (Feldman 2003: 77) . In order 
to criticise my argument, Feldman’s point could be reformulated as follows: 
the justification of considered judgments is independent from background 
beliefs . Consequently, it would be right to claim that RE involves ethical 
intuitions (i .e . non-inferential beliefs) in the form of considered judgments . 
My reply is two-fold . First, it should be noted that the objection begs the 
question . The reason is that the objection assumes precisely what coherent-
ism rejects – i .e . the possibility of self-justified beliefs . Put in other words, the 
problem is that such an objection assumes the falsity of the principle that is 
at the heart of coherentism: in order to justify the belief P, it is necessary to 
appeal to another belief . Second, the objection generates the problem speci-
fied in the previous section of this work . If we say that considered judgments 
are non-inferential beliefs, we violate the coherentist restriction assumed in 
RE . Consequently, we generate an inconsistent system of beliefs that inte-
grates the coherentist thesis, coherentist restriction, but also the assertion 
that non-inferential beliefs can play an important role in the justification of 
our theories .
The second objection runs as follows . The claim defended in this paper 
holds that considered judgments should not be defined as ethical intuitions 
but inferential beliefs even at the first stage of the process of reflective equi-
librium . The reason is that the coherentist character of RE rejects, by defi-
nition, any type of non-inferential justification . Nevertheless, the objector 
claims, that is just an analytical (maybe, “terminological”) claim without any 
substantive relevance in our theories . I argue that the objection is unjustified . 
It is evident that the minimum condition of any good theory is to have a 
rational basis . The argument presented in this paper is precisely about that 
requirement . If my theory is constructed on the basis of an alleged coheren-
tist method of justification in which non-inferential beliefs play an important 
justificatory role, the very methodological basis of my theory is irrational 
because it is inconsistent . Consider this example . For Rawls, “justification 
is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fit-
ting together into one coherent view” (Rawls 1999: 19) . If “justification is a 
matter of the mutual support”, it is plausible to conclude that there are no 
self-justified beliefs . Nevertheless, in some passages, Rawls accepts the exist-
ence of “provisional fixed points which we presume any conception of justice 
must fit” (Rawls 1999: 18) . If these provisional fixed points are non-inferen-
tial beliefs, there is an inconsistency in the epistemological background of his 
theory because it would violate the principle that “justification is a matter of 
the mutual support” . This is precisely the type of problem that my interpreta-
tion of RE tries to avoid .
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VI. Conclusion & Further Question
Does RE involve ethical intuitions? I argued that RE does not involve ethi-
cal intuitions because its coherentist character rejects, by definition, any 
type of non-inferentiality . If RE does not involve ethical intuitions, what are 
the so-called “considered judgments”? I argued that considered judgments 
should be defined as inferential beliefs because of the epistemological back-
ground of RE . The possibility of their inferential character relies on the role 
of background beliefs in the process of reflective equilibrium . I conclude by 
emphasising two points . First, as this work hopefully shows, the coherentist 
framework clarifies the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium in many 
ways: it allows us to specify its main concepts, distinguish it from the intui-
tionistic model of reasoning and elucidate the unexplored motivation behind 
the conditions imposed on the emergence of considered judgments . Second, 
as Rawls’ theory suggests, these conditions are necessary requirements in the 
process of reflective equilibrium . The practical implication of these condi-
tions is mostly unexplored in the literature . Consequently, that needs further 
analysis in future research .
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